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Following by Example?
July 2009
Humans make comparisons when seeking perspective.
Perhaps it is a Darwinian trait—where those most
aware of their relative position were more likely to
survive. This Newsletter argues that when it comes
to investing money, so-called “relative benchmarking” can
lead to poor decisions. In fact, we expect that historic
overreliance on benchmarks for both measuring success
and as an actual investment philosophy will result
in poor future performance for assets managed by closely
mirroring an index. At Hamilton Point, we avoid investment
purchases that lack merit beyond their heavy weighting
in an index. We also alert investors that we currently
find an exceptionally large portion of the broad market
to be simply “un-investable” at this time.
To be sure, benchmarking—which textbooks tell
us is the act of comparing a specific process to an
industry standard—can be a helpful endeavor.
For example, a study of cardiac clinics might point
to differences in outcomes that result in life-saving
recommendations. It is how a study controls certain
variables though, that must be understood before drawing
any serious conclusions. For example, would patients
want cardiac-care standards automatically set by the
average performance of only the 100 largest clinics?
What if smaller clinics were better?
Danger in Defining Risk Via a Benchmark
So-called financial experts have convinced many that
benchmarks are the essential part of investment performance
measurement. Perhaps even more insidiously, they
cleverly measure investment “risk” as
the degree to which a portfolio varies from the benchmark.
Although sounding logical, the underlying assumptions
are dangerous and have served to destroy tremendous
wealth in our country. Blindly following an index
or judging a portfolio’s risk based upon how “over
or under weighted” it is relative to a benchmark
is, in our view, no different than when a child justifies
their behavior because “everybody else is doing
it.”
The very construction of indexes is rather arbitrary
in terms of dictating an investment philosophy. The
hoopla and trading that takes place on the margin when
stocks are added or dropped into these faux buckets
is amazing. For example, after Russell reconstructed
their key indexes in June 2008, the Oil, Energy and
Materials sectors’ weighting in the Russell 1000
index (a large-cap index) increased 4.6%.¹ That meant
that managers tracking the Russell 1000 index had to
add stocks in these richly-valued sectors just before
an enormous selloff in these holdings weeks later.
These purchases were made almost entirely on the basis
of benchmark weightings as opposed to any other investment
thesis.
Preserving Capital or Benchmarks?
Recent history has shown that following the benchmark
can lead to some careless investment decisions that
increase risk, using a common-sense based assessment.
In the height of the internet stock bubble, the technology
sector grew to comprise more than 30% of the S&P
500 Index, the most institutionally recognized benchmark
for measuring stock investment success. Cisco was
then the largest company by market value, and by
definition, every investor in index funds had to
own it in large proportions—as did large so-called
closet index funds—even though its valuation
was indefensible. For perspective, Exxon is now worth
just over $300 billion and earned $45 billion last
year. At its peak in 2000, Cisco was worth close
to $600 billion but earned just $2.7 billion then—clearly
a wacky valuation², but not one to scare away most
money managers at the time because the “risk,” as
they were taught it, was in not owning it and other
over-valued stocks that dominated the index. (“But
Mommy, all the other kids stay up late.”) If
you think lessons were learned, then fast forward
to a timelier example concerning the financial sector
in 2007. Like the tech sector in 2000, financials
began to comprise a significant portion of the index—causing
benchmark-based investors to fret about the risks
of being “underweighted” financial holdings,
regardless of excessive leverage and looming real
estate problems.
Nonetheless, the marketing departments of the mega-fund
management firms have long sought comfort in the feeling
that they could protect their business plans if returns
simply approximated index returns. This logic began
the process wherein the investment community tried
to preserve theoretical benchmarks instead of client
capital. Moreover, as assets under management grow
for large institutions, it becomes not only the “safe” approach,
but a necessary one. Funds with billions under management
end up spreading their money across dozens (often hundreds
in the case of some funds) of individual stocks. Are
these the fund managers’ best picks they believe
will produce superior returns? We believe the answer
is clearly “no” in most cases.
Research Reveals Flaws in Benchmarking
Our long-held suspicions about these trends in money
management are supported by Martin Cremers’ and
Antti Petajisto’s research, published by the
Yale University School of Management.³ After extensive
analysis of the performance and holdings of domestic
equity mutual funds from 1980 to 2003, Cremers and
Petajisto reached the following conclusions:
- Small funds with less than $1 billion of assets
are more “active” (high deviation from benchmark),
while larger funds are more typically “closet
indexers” (i.e. non-index funds with relatively
low deviation from benchmark)
- This shift to closet indexing became more prevalent
starting in the 1990s
- The most actively managed funds meaningfully outperformed
the closet indexers (and the index) both before and
after expenses
Value in Flexibility, Freedom From Benchmarks
In contrast to the largest firms, one of which recently
rolled out an advertising campaign touting their
$1.3 trillion in client assets, we believe that Hamilton
Point’s boutique size is a decided strength
that permits a highly selective approach to stock
selection. Unfortunately for the investing public,
many capable money managers simply do not have our
flexibility and inevitably destroy capital by following
others.
Though we can never guarantee performance, we are
able to deliver a diversified portfolio that reflects
our beliefs on the best available investment opportunities,
given client goals and objectives. This is particularly
important in volatile markets, such as now, where large
segments of the investment universe are unappealing,
due to excessive debt, lack of regulatory clarity,
valuation or any of the other investment criteria we
use to eliminate stocks from consideration. To be specific,
of the 44 largest companies, which comprise roughly
half of the market value of the S&P 500, we own
only 11 of them at this time. While many money managers
spend the third quarter of 2009 looking back at the
annual mid-year reconstitution of indexes and rebalance
accordingly, we intend to remain selective and forward-looking
in our research as we position Hamilton Point-managed
portfolios for the future.
Your comments and questions are always welcomed.
Andrew C. Burns
President/Chief Investment Officer
Richard S. Woods
Chief Operating Officer
¹ Source: Russell Investments
² Interestingly, Cisco currently has an enterprise
value of $80 billion and earned $8 billion last year.
³ K. J. Martin Cremers, Antti Petajisto, How
Active is Your Fund Manager? A New Measure That Predicts
Performance, Yale School of Management, March 31, 2009.
Hamilton Point Investment Advisors is
an independent and independent-minded, boutique investment
advisory firm. Please contact us for a complimentary
review of your portfolio by calling (877) 636-3765.
In addition, visitors to the firm’s website,
www.HamiltonPoint.com, can read past investment newsletters.
Contact us for a complimentary review
of your investment portfolio in the context
of these
uncharted markets. Call 919-636-3765.
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